Nope, it's about Afganistan. How so?

Fallon's appointment to lead the Central Command was most noteworthy because he's the first admiral ever to hold that job, coming to it at a time when US ground forces were engaged in two substantial wars in the Command's territory, which stretches from northwest Africa to the Himilayas. Odd, no?

Yes, and it happened because Gates and the JCS wanted to give Petreaus, as the new Army big-wig in Iraq with the counter-insurgency background, the new strategy ad the surge of forces, freedom from having as his immediate superior another Army officer who would constantly be looking over his shoulder. This had been the case with Generals Franks and Abizaid at Central Command and complicated an otherwise already complex task. Petreaus may even have made keeping such a superior out of his way a condition of taking the Iraq command. In any case, enter Admiral Fallon.

Fallon may well have still had some disagreements with Petraeus and grumbled about them occasionally, but by and large, he did stay out of the general's way and muted any dissent.

Meanwhile, as the Iraq situation improved -- and not incidentally, the US-Iran tensions subsided notably -- the war in Afganistan and the related conflict inside Pakistan -- has grwon a whole lot worse. NATO forces in southern Afganistan, despite dogged fighting by British, Canadian and Dutch troops, have come under severe pressure from a resurgent Taliban. Elsewhere, while US and Afgan forces have been holding their own just fine, attacks are up and security getting dicier. Across the border in Pakistan, a Pakistani "Taliban" has emerged from the Pashtun tribes as a significant force, and al Qaeda and other jihadists are waging a campaign of terror against Pakistani targets.

So, unlike when Fallon was brought on board, the focus of strategic concern is no longer on Iraq or Iran but on the crucial Afgan-Pakistan front. And Gates and the Pentagon brass doubtless have been looking for new ideas, strategies and initiatives there. For all his merits, Fallon is emphaticallly not the guy needed in the critical command position with these priorities. It may be that Gates and the JCS have decided to promote Petraeus to the job, so he can bring his proven strengths to the Afgan war. Or that another skilled ground force commander is under consideration.

Fallon's treading at the edge of public criticisms in this interview may well be the result, not the cause, of his impending ouster. In other words, he knew he was being eased out to make way for someone better suited to the demands of the moment and understandably resents it. However, no one should get too worked up about it; circumstances change in military operations and command needs must change with them. To a large extent, it was the reluctance of Bush and Rumsfeld to show some flexibility from the outset of these wars that put us in a bad place to begin with.

Wow, there is a lot of wishful thinking here. I especially like "Iraq is so good it isn't a conscern", despite the fact that the increased troop committment is indefinite, as well as the implication that the decrease in Iraqi violence has brought Iran to the table as oppossed to the other way around.

Gee, your post seems to be an outstanding example of someone seeing what he prefers to see, rather than what is actually there. I wrote nothing from which you can infer that I think "Iraq is so good it isn't a concern" and nothing that implies that "the decrease in Iraqi violence has brought Iran to the table."

What I said was that Kaplan -- and others -- are off base in thinking that either Iraq or Iran is the reason for Fallon's resignation and I point out the following:

"Meanwhile, as the Iraq situation improved -- and not incidentally, the US-Iran tensions subsided notably -- the war in Afganistan and the related conflict inside Pakistan -- has grown a whole lot worse."

From the point of view of Gates and the JCS, the current, most critical problem is the Afgan-Pakistan front, which they see as demanding a new or different approach before the situation deterioates further, while they feel Iraq is "improved" and Iran likewise as "US-Iran tensions subsided." I believe all of these assessments are incontrovertibly correct. In the case of Iran, my view is that the easing of tensions is BOTH a cause and effect of the improvement in Iraq and also influenced by Iranian domestic politics and several other factors. I seek here not to explain either Iraq or Iran in detail because that's not the subject. The subject is Fallon and I believe he has been pushed out or encouraged to move on because his superiors want to put someone else in charge of Central Command who they believe can and will do something new or different on the Afgan-Pakistan front.

This is really a fairly simple point that will be supported or not soon enough when a new officer to oversee Central is named. My first bet is that it will be Petraeus.