To the Editor, Washington Post
Who sets “requirements” for the Department of Defense?
On Tuesday, February 19th the Post ran an AP story based on a February 5th interview with Air Force Maj. General Selva in which he is quoted as saying "We have never rolled off of the requirement to field 381 F-22s,". [Aging Air Force Wants Big Bucks Fix]

The story also noted the previous week’s incident in which The Air Force System Command’s General Carlson had been rebuked By Secretary Gates for implying that the Air Force would continue to push for more F-22 advanced fighter planes than have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. These stories reopen a major issue that should have been long settled: Who sets “requirements” for the Department of Defense?
This issue was supposedly settled at least two decades ago when the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened and clarified the role of the Secretary of Defense, and the (then) new Undersecretary for Acquisition. It is quite clear, at least on paper, that the Secretary of Defense, after considering the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the regional and functional four star “Combatant Commanders”, has both the authority and the responsibility for determining what forces and associated equipage and posture are appropriate to meet the military needs of national security. The resulting Presidential budget proposals convey those determinations to the Congress.
Embedded in the “requirements” concept are two different (but related) management decisions that the Secretary must make. One type of “requirement” defines the key characteristics of each new weapon system that is to be acquired. How fast must it go? What payload must it carry? How stealthy should it be? How should it be linked to headquarters and other units? The other type of “requirements” decision is “how many are appropriate?” How many of the new weapons systems should be acquired? What force structure – battalions, squadrons, etc – and manning levels should be associated with the new systems? In general, decisions on individual weapon systems key characteristics are delegated to the Undersecretary for Acquisition. But the “how many” decisions about the basic future force structure of the US military are clearly to be made by the Secretary himself.
The primary job of the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine is as Force Providers. They are not decisive setters of "requirements" in either of the foregoing senses. They are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces that the Secretary, after consulting with the Chairman, has determined are appropriate and that have been authorized and funded by the Congress. But the “service chiefs” are usually highly experienced former combatant commanders who by law have the ear of the CJCS in his deliberations that contribute to the Secretary's decisions, so their views are well represented. And as the resident “subject matter experts” on the specific technologies that are employed in their canonical domains, it is clearly appropriate that the chiefs have a strong say in setting the detailed specifications for the equipment that their services will acquire.
All officials are of course required to give the Congress their personal opinions when asked, even when those opinions differ from the Department’s “official” position. But it was surprising to see the “Force Providing” military service chiefs respond in a very official and public manner to Congressman Hunter’s recent invitation to provide him their service's official lists of “unfunded requirements” - again because the military services don't set "requirements". In addition to rebuking the type of “freelancing” cited above, some previous Secretaries have also discouraged such formal service “responses” that bypass duly constituted authority. This recent unbudgeted $30B public request by the service chiefs can only further complicate Secretary Gates’ efforts to meet his responsibilities for determining “How much is enough” and making the case to the Congress.
Perhaps one way out of this chronic problem would be to appropriate an even greater fraction of defense funding to the Secretary rather than to the services, and let the Secretary and the Combatant Commanders "buy" most or all of the needed capabilities from the "providing" military services. One place to start such a move would be to further centralize the acquisition and support of equipment that is relatively common across two or more services, such as fighter aircraft and UAVs.