I presume we have corn subsidies to encourage farmers to plant corn where otherwise the market would not encourage them to do so. What about the market is failing to encourage them to do so? Again, I presume it's because the price, without subsidy, would not be high enough to attract farmers to plant it. But if we suddenly jack up demand for corn by mandating huge ethanol production, wouldn't that (as I have heard some complain on talk radio) jack up the price? And as the price comes up, should it not be possible in equal measure to bring the subsidy down?

In other words, wouldn't ethanol production tend to reduce federal spending on corn subsidies?

I agree that the huge questions of quantity, and of net energy gain, are troubling, but we have to start somewhere and aim high. Someday we're going to have to do without oil, and if we can improve the efficiency of ethanol production, it would be a natural piece of the puzzle for this country.

Farming subsidies come in many forms. Your theory seems to be based on the idea that they'd make some sort of economic sense. I think they're more about political payback than encouraging farmers to plant crops they otherwise wouldn't - they get subsidies even for profitable crops. There are market loss subsidies (counteracting losses) which would be reduced, but they're not that significant for corn, and I would guess will be negligible now with the ethanol-fueled shortages. Most corn subsidies are for Production Flexibility Contracts (PFCs) or below-market-rate loans. PFCs confuse me, but it seems the basic idea is farms get a certain amount of money as long as they're farming. There are some stipulations as to what they grow, and these formulas *could* be adjusted to reduce corn subsidies, but corn lobbyists are only gaining in strength, so that seems unlikely.