Judge Cordell violated the Code of Conduct for judges in this state when she ruled on cases in which she had an emotional interest. Canon One is both broad and specific. It states, "A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary." It has been long interpreted to mean a judge cannot take a case in which they have a personal interest, monetary or otherwise. The judge's personal experience and so close in time to her rulings means she was clearly biased. The actions of her fellow judges in not following her lead are additional support of this.

The judge had an absolute obligation to recuse herself from drunk driving cases and should have taken up her advocacy of interlocks to the political sphere. She abused her power as a judge when she chose not to.

A good idea marred by simply shameful behavior. Shame on you, Judge Cordell.

The requirement of an unbiased judiciary does not require a sheltered, ignorant judiciary. Judges are actual human beings with real lives, and their real lives informs their rulings from the bench and, in fact, makes them capable of judging in a humane and thoughtful way.

The notion that judges should be nothing more than judicial computers ruling without feeling and with no sense of the real world is absurd. The judge did nothing wrong in ruling on DUI cases after the accident. There is no evidence that she was rendered unable to make fair rulings about the guilt or innocence of DUI suspects, or to fashion appropriate sentences.

Indeed, the fact that she ordered ignition interlock with lower fines, instead of simply mandating higher fines and more jail time, shows that her real-world experience gave her a more thoughtful, nuanced approach to these troublesome cases.

I disagree. In fact, I think that many judges are biased for the opposite reason, that they themselves like to have a drink or two and sympathize with defendants in DUI cases. I think the judge is behaving in a thoughtful and just way.

I agree with CAT51. Unless you your family or a friend has experienced the effects of a drunk driver, you are inclined to think, "no biggie." There is a huge difference between 1 or 2 drinks at a party (which would often pass a breath test), and someone who frequently drives over the legal limit. If know someone who was seriously injured or died as a result of a drunk driver, erring on the side of caution doesn't seem like much of a sacrifice.

I also believe that of more judges had experienced periods where they couldn't work, where they couldn't afford health care, or day care, or many of the other difficulties that the middle class deals with on a day-to-day basis, they would tend toward fairer judgments regarding these issues as well.

MacAdvisor:

The actions of her fellow judges in not following her lead are additional support of this.

For your theory to hold, judges nationwide who don't impose this punishment would have to know where it originated. It's hard to buy that some judge on the East Cost is sitting in his chambers right now going "No way am I going to impose a lock on this drunk's car because back in 1987 this judge in California totally overstepped her bounds."

I'm also struggling with what your motivation is: Her punishment is actually less punitive in terms of fines and jail time than some others would like to see. It's not like she's having people stoned in the public square.

Apart from whether or not the judge violated judicial ethics, her account gives ample evidence that judges are indeed swayed by their personal experiences. When Justice Sotomeyer was being confirmed there was much discussion about the role of empathy (much less sympathy) in making judicial rulings. Clearly, the variety of life experiences (including being hit by a drunk driver) that one brings to the bench influences both the reading of the law and the types of punishments meted out.

Judges routinely and without pause eliminate from juries judging criminal defendants those possible members who've recently been the victim of a crime, even an unrelated crime. We all recognize how emotionally powerful an experience being a victim can be and how nearly impossible separating ourselves from the facts is under such circumstances. The judge was back on the bench judging DUI cases eight weeks, not even two full months. Does anyone really suggest the impact of her own personal circumstances would not affect her judgment?

Judges aren't and can't be unemotional cyborgs computing justice. They are, however, supposed to be dispassionate. Their personal narrative alone cannot be the basis for a course of action. Judge Cordell clearly states her new course of action was motivated by her very recent experiences. If Judge Cordell had worked for Jack in the Box as a teenager and then, thirty years later, had a case involving Jack in the Box, there might still be the suggestion she should recuse. However, if she had worked for them just eight weeks prior, there wouldn't be any question, she would have to recuse.

Judges are not supposed to make law, that includes changing the sentences imposed for certain crimes. I think her suggestion a worthy one, well-deserving of attention. However, it was not her place to impose this change from the bench. She should have campaigned to change the law like anyone else. I am sure the mothers in MADD would much rather just double or triple the sentences that have to bother with all the convincing others nonsense. To impose her personal judgment, rather than society' as expressed in law, is a violation of her duty. Judge Cordell imposed a sentence that simply was not contemplated by the legislature.

I think having judges from all walks of life help our judiciary. I think having a wider variety of life experience on the Supremes is better than five old white Catholic guys can give is a plus. However, experience in general used to view cases from a different angle is very different from a judge who is closely tied to the matter at hand creating new law out of whole cloth to fashion a punishment she and she alone has decided is better than the one the legislature has imposed is a very, very matter.

Let me suggest an alternate possibility: What is Judge Cordell's husband had been arrested on a DUI just two months previous. She personally witnessed how unfair the judicial system was, how hard it was for the accused's family, how expenses mounted up, and how difficult any real defense was. She decided, rather than sentence DUI felons to jail, they would all go to a three-day treatment program and she would waive all fines. She knows how useless jail is and how much a financial burden such cases are, so she cut the fines to allow for treatment. Would you all be so quick to applaud her being a judicial activist and meting out punishment creatively?

Judge Cordell ruled on a matter she was simply too personally connected with and she needed to recuse herself. Failing to do is a failure of judicial ethics and her fellow judges should have removed her from rotation the moment they found out what she was doing.

Again, I'll ask why this is such an issue for you? And where is the evidence that somebody was treated unfairly? I can see your point, but it's moot without any evidence that someone was harmed.

that was my first thought when i read that. it's not that interlocks are a bad idea, she was just too close to the issue and shouldn't have been hearing those cases. hell, i'm not even a lawyer, and i know that.

apparently, the public defender representing that first guy wasn't very good at his job.

Why is this an issue for me? I rather like our system of government and, as a citizen, I don't like it when one part of our government tries to be some other parts. I didn't like how Congress tried to play judge in the Schivo matter and I don't like it when judges pass laws. The Supremes are a somewhat different case, but a simply trial judge is to apply the law as written, whatever her personal opinion, whatever the affect. The appellate system may have to adjust things, but not a trial judge.

Who was harmed? First, the defendants who had a sentenced imposed that was not part of the punishment society determined. They had an ex post facto sentence, one created after the crime. Society was harmed because a judge decided to go beyond her scope and do that she isn't supposed to. I didn't like Bush going beyond our law to torture people against the law, I don't like this judge going beyond the law to punish people. In the long run, society is best served by each party playing their assigned roles. If we are going to make things up as we go along, I think many will eventually be very unhappy with the result.

Yes, the Public Defender's Office was asleep at the switch here, but that isn't unusual for such offices. They are understaffed, underpaid, and carry case loads five or more fold greater than private attorneys with fewer resources. Still, they should have joined with the DA to stop this nonsense.

Judges have broad, almost unfettered discretion in sentencing, provided they remain with legislative and Constitutional guidelines -- punishments can't exceed statutory maximums or be "cruel and unusual." This would include, one assumes, ordering the imposition of an ignition interlock device; such an order neither increases incarceration beyond the maximum allowed by statute, nor constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, the problem this judge encountered was that she considered the cost of such a device part of the "fine" imposed on the defendant, and thus reduced the amount of the fine payable to the court -- a legal ruling which was overturned by a higher court, which happens to all judges from time to time.

Society is not harmed by a judge imposing a lawful, Constitutional, but nontraditional punishment. This is a case of a judge's real-world experience informing her rulings on the bench and causing her to come up with an innovative, smart, practical approach to recidivism. It is an imperfect approach, but the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

In Maryland, the imposition of an ignition interlock device is done administratively. If you refuse to submit to a blood alcohol test, or if it is a second offense, your license is taken away in an administrative proceeding that is separate from the criminal proceeding. The only way to avoid the license suspension is to agree to an ignition interlock device. In my experience, that choice runs about 50-50 -- about half the people prefer to take the suspension, and half prefer to take the interlock device (which, as the judge pointed out, is rather expensive -- you pay for installation, and you also pay a monthly fee for the monitoring). If you are caught driving a non-interlock car, you're arrested -- it's the same as driving without a license, punishable by jail time even if you're stone sober. If you're caught having your child blow into the tube for you (which does happen), you're in big trouble, too; God help you when the judge hears that. But that is fairly rare for the simple reason that not only do you have to blow into the tube to start the car, but you have to blow into it periodically to keep the car running, and it's positioned such that it's hard for anyone other than the driver to reach it.

One last aside, relating to people who think that a single glass of wine won't trigger a DUI -- guess again. While you probably won't be impaired or notice any effects from a single drink, when the BAC limit was lowered to .08, it is entirely possible that one drink can put you over the limit without you knowing it.

(Want to stop drunk driving? Insane criminal penalties won't do it. Invest in mass transit.)

MacAdvisor:

Still, they should have joined with the DA to stop this nonsense.

I do see where you are coming from. I guess my confusion lies in why you are solely focusing on what this judge did back in the 1980s. Many states have made these devices law since then and as the article notes the problem now is that some judges (for whatever reason) refuse to impose them as penalties even when they are required to do so. They're effectively making up their own rules in the same way the original judge did. But I don't see you saying they should be censured, you seem to only be concerned with this one judge.

Rocket88 wrote the following post at 09/23/2009 9:08 AM:
"Judges have broad, almost unfettered discretion in sentencing, provided they remain with legislative and Constitutional guidelines."

I don't know where you get that idea, but it is flat out wrong. Each crime carries a specified punishment. Sometimes in some places those punishments are a range -- five to ten years and a fine up to $10,000 -- and in some places the punishment is very specific -- $150 plus $10/10 miles over the speed limit plus $163 administrative fee. Generally, punishments are noted as either a fine and time or a combination of both. Some types of crimes carry additional punishments such as not living within a 100 yards of a school, but ALL the punishments for each specific crime are specified. The decisions of the judge are most certainly fettered. For a crime carrying a fine of up $100 and/or ten days in jail, the judge cannot impose a $1,000 fine and twenty days in jail.

Nor can she impose interlocks. They aren't part of the sentence. She can impose $50 and five days in jail. She can't impose $150 and three days in jail. She can't impose $75 and three days walking around in a chicken suit. She can't impose 4 lashes.

I think you must be thinking of sentencing guidelines, which attempt to direct judges to impose a particular punishment on someone with a specific set of circumstances. If the punishment is up to a $1,000 fine and twenty days in jail, for example, the guidelines might suggest $100 and two days for a first timer, $500 and ten days for a second violation, and the max from there on out. A Federal judge for Federal crimes ignore the guidelines. In some states, the guidelines are mandatory and not in others. The Federal Constitution made guidelines advisory in Federal cases. Again however, nothing allows the judge to impose a sentence not included in the statutory punishment.

"Society is not harmed by a judge imposing a lawful, Constitutional, but nontraditional punishment." True, but this isn't a case of that. She is imposing an unlawful, unconstitutional (being ex post facto) punishment. I am not bothered by the nontraditional part, but there is some difficulty in imposing a nontraditional punishment that is also one specified in the law. Society is harmed when judges make up the law as they go along. One of the main purposes of our Constitution is to prohibit arbitrary and capricious punishments.


Sundown wrote the following post at 09/23/2009, 9:56 AM:
"But I don't see you saying they should be censured, you seem to only be concerned with this one judge."

Those judges may have violated ethics, too, and I agree they should equally be punished for not following the law, if that is what actually happened. However, I don't know their names, the specific circumstances, or if the statement is particularly true. The article doesn't give specifics and cases of judges not enforcing interlocks when the law demands them. Hard to be excised about vagueness.

However, Judge Cordell wrote an article stating she wasn't following the law and was imposing sentences based on her very recent and negative experience. She violated her duty as a judge to be impartial and not allowing personal feelings to guide as well violating the law by imposing a punishment not legally called for. I don't know what the other judges did or even who they are, but I know what Cordell did, because she wrote about it.

MacAdvisor:

Rocket88 wrote the following post at 09/23/2009 9:08 AM: "Judges have broad, almost unfettered discretion in sentencing, provided they remain with legislative and Constitutional guidelines." I don't know where you get that idea, but it is flat out wrong.

No, actually he's right. Judges have wide powers when it comes to sentencing. Here's an article, written by an attorney critical of creative sentencing, detailing unusual sentences handed down by judges around the country, including the interlock devices. (Other examples include guys being ordered to pay child support to the children of the person they killed, killers having to carry pictures of their victims, violators of noise ordinances having to listen to Wayne Newton music, etc.) What you'll note is that even though the author is against these sorts of sentences, at no point does he claim the judges overstepped their bounds or did anything improper.

Because the article didn't not provide case numbers or any other information I could use to trace the facts of the case and the actual sentence imposed, I can't give the article any weight. Judges do not have the power to give a sentence other than that provided by law. What happens, and what Judge Cordell did, was to make a bargain with the convicted to not impose the legally mandated sentencing IF the defendant agreed to the alternative sentencing, the use of interlocks in Judge Cordell's case.

Both Federal courts for Federal cases and courts here in California have struck down such agreements as not enforceable. The parties are not negotiating freely and changes in sentencing cannot legally be used as consideration (an important part of any contract). Other states may allow such bargains. Judges can impose conditions as part of probation conditions, but -- again and in Federal and California cases -- such conditions generally are not enforceable. Once the case transfers to the probation authorities, they can wave such terms. Making someone build a memorial cross on a highway shoulder, as one of the examples the article you cited indicated, would create all sorts of problems, from not having proper permits, to violating highway rules, to the liability the cross itself creates as a hazard, to the danger to the defendant while building such a thing, and the obvious First Amendment issues of a judge ordering the construction of a Christian symbol on public land.

These abomination alternative sentences survive simply because the defendant doesn't challenge them and know one else does too.

However, Judge Cordell's problem was involvement in cases in which she had an obvious and direct emotional attachment. She should not have been ruling, let alone sentencing, in cases where the issue was something she had experienced not two months previously. She needed to recuse herself and advocating for interlocks as a citizen, not impose them as a judge.