I work in IT. I have worked in IT for nearly 10 years. The aforementioned article ("Why corporate IT should unchain our office computers") was written by someone so clueless that they should never be allowed to write again.
I'm going to take this point by point:
They've heard about the joys of Firefox, the wonders of Google Docs, or any number of other great programs or Web sites that might improve how they work. Indeed, they use these apps at home all the time, and they love them.
And half of their home computers are infected - keyloggers, rootkits, remote administration packages - that they don't even know are there, thanks to their browsing habits. At least once a week, I have an employee asking our IT department, on COMPANY time, to fix their home computer (which they "use for work", namely checking into the corporate webmail access on the weekend) for them. Invariably, the end result is that they screwed up, their home network is insecure, they turned off critical things like system updates because it was "annoying to have to restart", and they left themselves wide fucking open.
But at work they're stymied by the IT department, that class of interoffice Brahmins that decides, ridiculously and capriciously, how people should work.
We decide neither ridiculously nor capriciously. On the contrary, we do an amazing amount of testing DESPITE ever-shortening budgets, constant frivolous and wasteful demands on our time because people are incapable of following clearly written instructions (for example, jamming a toner cartridge into their printer without removing packaging clips, thus damaging the cartridge and the printer), and an ever-increasing list of applications we are expected to support at moment's notice so that when Janie Secretary can't figure out how to do her job, we can come in - without our having any formal training on the various forms and procedures involved, despite the fact that they just sent her off for a full WEEK of training - and teach her how to do her job again.
When we say an application has security holes, we are justified in saying so. When we point out that an application causes conflicts with another application already in-use in the office, we know what the fuck we are talking about. Our decisions and recommendations are neither ridiculous, nor capricious.
The secretary of state didn't know why Firefox was blocked; an aide stepped in to explain that the free program was too expensive—"it has to be administered, the patches have to be loaded." Isn't that how it always is? You ask your IT manager to let you use something that seems pretty safe and run-of-the-mill, and you're given an outlandish stock answer about administrative costs and unseen dangers lurking on the Web.
Google the phrase "Firefox vulnerability".
Again: we do not give "outlandish stock answers." We test. We verify. We approach from the area of caution, because it is OUR JOB to approach new software and software interactions that way. It is our primary job, not to make it so that you can do whatever you want all day, but to ensure that the network is secure, that your email is not compromised, that your bank account information is not compromised, that the various patents and secure documents stored in the systems are not compromised.
That "something that seems pretty safe and run-of-the-mill"? Oh, yeah. I remember you. You're the one who installed that "waving flag display" the month after 9/11 - the one that Bonzi Buddy, Weather Display, Weather Display 2, Popup Ad Software versions 2 all the way through fucking 92, and everything else that slowed your system to a crawl tagged in along with. Then WE had to come down and haul your assigned computer off, completely rebuild it to get rid of the insidious crap YOU let in, only to have your boss harassing our boss about how it was "taking so long" and how you were "without your computer" and why didn't "we" do more to stop it.
You're the one who two months ago clicked on the "ooh this is the newest thing on facebook but you have to be running this browser add-on to see it" crap, and got your system infested with a rootkit and keylogger. So not only did we have to sit and rebuild your system yet again, we had to force everyone in the department who may have logged in to it to change their passwords, we had to go to active scanning of the network for the communication ports it was using in case you'd done it on someone else's computer as well and just weren't fessing up.
Like TSA guards at the airport, workplace IT wardens are rarely amenable to rational argument.
Your "rational argument" means little given your history above.
As I've written before, switching from Outlook to Gmail changed my life; hosting my e-mail at Google freed me from methodically backing up old mail, which is an important way I remember my reporting contacts. When I worked in an office not long ago, though, a new man in IT decided that forwarding company mail to my Gmail account might violate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Yep. And that's fine. RIGHT UP UNTIL the day where Gmail has a day like this: <link>
Then, what do you do? What happens when copies of a contract, supposed to be held in confidence, leak early because your Gmail account is compromised?
You think you are "reasonable." We spend many hours discussing, with management, what they want, what is needed for security, and trying to hash things out. At the end of the day, you have your "reasonable argument" with zero proof or documentation behind it, while we have over a decade's history of users causing problems because they got into something they shouldn't have. And every time a problem comes up, it costs money. Usually a significant amount of money.
Sure. Rather than restrict access for everyone—ensuring that nobody ever learns which programs are genuinely bad news and which are blocked just for convenience's sake—they can educate workers about how to use their computers.
We try to. Oh my god, how we try to educate users. We are CONSTANTLY trying to get management to set up training sessions where we can educate users on responsible computer use. We are constantly sending out information on the latest high-risk behavior and the latest scams and phishing trends to warn users so that IF they see, for example, the latest "hey clik this face book linky its rilly kewl" thing that redirects not to Facebook but to a website designed to, say, exploit a Firefox bug and download a malicious payload to your system, they will know to reject it.
You know what our attempts to educate users get? Ignored. We get told by users, "I don't have time to read all the stuff you send out." We get told by management that safe-computing education sessions are a "waste" of "time that could be more productively spent on-task." And then, when inevitably some dumbass like you with a web connection and a little too much privilege to install or download things sets a worm loose on the network and shuts half the company down or makes the email server inaccessible because it's handling 10000x its normal traffic load, management wants to know why we "didn't do more to stop it."
In conclusion: Farhad Manjoo, you should never be allowed to write again. You don't know the first thing about what you are talking about, and are doubtless one of the problem users that ruined it for everyone.