i remember hearing cronkite make that statement "we cannot win the war" right to my face. i realized walter cronkite had just lied and misused the trust that all those rightous american citizens had put in him. ole sly walter had played the network game for years never stepping outside a certain boundry to keep him popular and rule the ratings game. the con job worked to perfection and today everybody says "the man america trusted died". i never trusted the sumbitch my father taught me better than that.

mr cronkite lied that day. the tet offensive had been a disastor for the viet cong. they had suffer huge losses in both men and material. south viet nam had held. the south viet namese troops had fought valiently for the most part and more important the south viet namese had not joined the cong. but mr cronkite didn't see it that way he was old and tired now and he let his defeatist emotions speak. what if he had said the truth we were almost there. let us do as the engilsh did under winston chuchill did let us win the fight. let us make the commitment to win.

but mr cronkite coose to lead us down a defeatist path.

what happened was we dithered for seven more years and lost the war and many lives. many of my friends came back in body bags. the nation was torn apart. i hope that made you happy mr cronkite.

the truths were different as the participants.

northern truth

It was not until after the conclusion of the first phase of the offensive that Hanoi realized that its sacrifices might not have been in vain. General Tran Do, North Vietnamese commander at the battle of Hue, gave some insight into how defeat was translated into victory:

In all honesty, we didn't achieve our main objective, which was to spur uprisings throughout the South. Still, we inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans and their puppets, and this was a big gain for us. As for making an impact in the United States, it had not been our intention — but it turned out to be a fortunate result.[137]

Hanoi had in no way anticipated the political and psychological effect the offensive would have on the leadership and population of the U.S.[138] When the northern leadership saw how the U.S. was reacting to the offensive, they began to propagandize their "victory". The opening of negotiations and the diplomatic struggle, the option feared by the Party militants prior to the offensive, quickly came to occupy a position equal to that of the military struggle.[139]

On 5 May Trường Chinh rose to address a congress of Party members and proceeded to castigate the Party militants and their bid for quick victory. His "faction-bashing" tirade sparked a serious debate within the party leadership which lasted for four months. As the leader of the "main force war" and "quick victory" faction, Lê Duẩn also came under severe criticism. In August, Chinh's report on the situation was accepted in toto, published, and broadcast via Radio Hanoi. He had single-handedly shifted the nation's war strategy and restored himself to prominence as the Party's ideological conscience.[140] Meanwhile, the Vietcong proclaimed itself the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and took part in future peace negotiations under this title. It would be a long seven years until victory.

southern truth:

In the wake of the offensive, however, fresh determination was exhibited by the Thieu government. On 1 February the President declared a state of martial law and, on 15 June, the National Assembly passed his request for a general mobilization of the population and the induction of 200,000 draftees into the armed forces by the end of the year (a decree that had failed to pass only five months previously due to strong political opposition).[145] This increase would bring South Vietnam's troop strength to more than 900,000 men.[146][147] Military mobilization, anti-corruption campaigns, demonstrations of political unity, and administrative reforms were quickly carried out.[148] Thiệu also established a National Recovery Committee to oversee food distribution, resettlement, and housing construction for the new refugees. Both the government and the Americans were encouraged by a new determination that was exhibited among the ordinary citizens of the Republic. Many urban dwellers were indignant that the communists had launched their attacks during Tet and it drove many who had been previously apathetic into active support of the government. Journalists, political figures, and religious leaders alike — even the militant Buddhists — professed confidence in the government's plans.[149]

Thiệu saw an opportunity to consolidate his personal power and he took it. His only real political rival was Vice President Ky, the former Air Force commander, who had been outmaneuvered by Thiệu in the presidential election of 1967. In the aftermath of Tet, Ky supporters in the military and the administration were quickly removed from power, arrested, or exiled.[150] A crack-down on the South Vietnamese press also ensued and there was a worrysome return of former President Ngô Đình Diệm's Can Lao Party members to high positions in the government and military. By the summer of 1968, the President had earned a less exalted sobriquet among the South Vietnamese population, who had begun to call him "the little dictator."[151]

Thieu had also become very suspicious of his American allies, unwilling to believe (as did many South Vietnamese) that the U.S. had been caught by surprise by the offensive. "Now that it's all over," he queried a visiting Washington official, "you really knew it was coming didn't you?"[152][153] Lyndon Johnson's unilateral decision on 31 March to curtail the bombing of North Vietnam only confirmed what Thiệu already feared - the Americans were going to abandon South Vietnam to the communists. For Thiệu, the bombing halt and the beginning of negotiations with the North brought not the hope of an end to the war, but "an abiding fear of peace."[152] He was only mollified after an 18 July meeting with Johnson in Honolulu, where the American president affirmed that Saigon would be a full partner in all negotiations and that the U.S. would not "support the imposition of a coalition government, or any other form of government, on the people of South Vietnam"

american truth:

The Tet Offensive created a crisis within the Johnson administration, which became increasingly unable to convince the American public that it had been a major defeat for the communists. The optimistic assessments made prior to the offensive by the administration and the Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the "credibility gap" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm.[155]

The shocks that reverberated from the battlefield continued to widen: On 18 February 1968 MACV posted the highest U.S. casualty figures for a single week during the entire war — 543 killed, 2,547 wounded.[156] As a result of the heavy fighting, 1968 went on to become the deadliest year of the war for the US forces with 16,592 soldiers killed.[157] On 23 February the U.S. Selective Service System announced a new draft call for 48,000 men, the second highest of the war.[158] On 28 February Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who had overseen the escalation of the war in 1964–1965, but who had eventually turned against it, stepped down from office.

During the first two weeks of February, Generals Westmoreland and Wheeler communicated as to the necessity for reinforcements or troop increases in Vietnam. Westmoreland insisted that he only needed those forces either in-country or already scheduled for deployment and he was puzzled by the sense of unwarranted urgency in Wheeler's queries.[159] Westmoreland was tempted, however, when Wheeler emphasized that the White House might loosen restraints and allow operations in Laos, Cambodia, or possibly even North Vietnam itself.[160] On 8 February, Westmoreland responded that he could use another division "if operations in Laos are authorized".[161] Wheeler responded by challenging Westmoreland's assessment of the situation, pointing out dangers that his on-the-spot commander did not consider palpable, concluding: "In summary, if you need more troops, ask for them."[162]

Wheeler's bizarre promptings were influenced by the severe strain imposed upon the U.S. military by the Vietnam commitment, one which had been undertaken without the mobilization of its reserve forces. The Joint Chiefs had repeatedly requested national mobilization, not only to prepare for a possible intensification of the war, but also to ensure that the nation's strategic reserve did not become depleted.[163] By obliquely ordering Westmoreland to demand more forces, Wheeler was attempting to solve two pressing problems.[79] In comparison with MACV's previous communications, which had been full of confidence, optimism, and resolve, Westmoreland's 12 February request for 10,500 troops was much more urgent: "which I desperately need... time is of the essence."[164] On 13 February 10,500 previously authorized U.S. airborne troops and marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs then played their hand, advising President Johnson to turn down MACV's requested division-sized reinforcement unless he called up some 1,234,001 marine and army reservists.[165]

Johnson dispatched Wheeler to Saigon on 20 February to determine military requirements in response to the offensive. Both Wheeler and Westmoreland were elated that in only eight days McNamara would be replaced by the hawkish Clark Clifford and that the military might finally obtain permission to widen the war.[166] Wheeler's written report of the trip, however, contained no mention of any new contingencies, strategies, or the building up the strategic reserve. It was couched in grave language that suggested that the 206,756-man request it proposed was a matter of vital military necessity.[167] Westmoreland wrote in his memoir that Wheeler had deliberately concealed the truth of the matter in order to force the issue of the strategic reserve upon the President.[168]

On 27 February Johnson and McNamara discussed the proposed troop increase. To fulfill it would require an increase in overall military strength of about 400,000 men and the expenditure of an additional $10 billion during fiscal 1969 and another $15 billion in 1970.[169] These monetary concerns were pressing. Throughout the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1968, the U.S. was struggling with "one of the most severe monetary crises" of the period. Without a new tax bill and budgetary cuts, the nation would face even higher inflation "and the possible collapse of the monetary system".[170] Johnson's friend Clark Clifford was concerned about what the American public would think of the escalation: "How do we avoid creating the feeling that we are pounding troops down a rathole?"[171]

According to the Pentagon Papers, "A fork in the road had been reached and the alternatives stood out in stark reality." To meet Wheeler's request would mean a total U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam. "To deny it, or to attempt to cut it to a size which could be sustained by the thinly stretched active forces, would just as surely signify that an upper limit to the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam had been reached."[172]

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Whatever. There was no way to win the war since we were never going to conquer the North and risk war with Russia or China. We were only there to 'send a message' and the message simply wasn't accepted. Quite similar to our nonsense in Iraq and likely Afghanistan, also only to 'send a message.'

Don't blame Walter for telling the truth.

your full of shit, cronkite did not tell the truth. the mofo cronkite lied to the american people. that is an inconvienient truth you do not have the intellectual courage to face. walter cronkite was a lying phoney loser at that point. but he was and is an icon to you and as we all know icons should be smashed on a regular basis.

Sorry, jughead, but we weren't going to 'win' anything in Vietnam. We were simply attempting to 'send a message.' It was a demonstation war, a war to demonstrate American resolve against communist aggression. The message was intended not just for communists and the rest of the world, but also for American right wingers here at home.

The rest of the world figured out that the message meant pretty much nothing and could be fully ignored, but you never figured it out, did you?

See Kaplan on McNamara (I added the bolding):

At first, McNamara and his entourage blithely assumed that war, like everything else, could be rationally analyzed and tightly controlled, without the need for much insight into the enemy's aims, motivation, or culture. On May 22, 1964, three months before the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, sent Johnson a memo (reproduced in the Pentagon Papers), informing him of a "small, tightly knit group" that was preparing an "integrated political-military plan" to broaden the war through "graduated action against North Vietnam." He went on:

The theory of this plan is that we should strike to hurt but not to destroy, and strike for the purpose of changing the North Vietnamese decision on intervention in the south. This is easier said than done, but McNamara has confidence that we have the military means as long as we have the political will.

Two days later, a memo signed by McNamara, Bundy, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk urged Johnson to "use selected and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam" for as long as the North's leaders refused to back down. John McNaughton, McNamara's closest assistant, described the concept in a memo as "Progressive squeeze-and-talk. Present policies plus an orchestration of communications with Hanoi and a crescendo of additional military moves against infiltration targets, first in Laos and then in [South Vietnam], and then against other targets in North Vietnam. The scenario would be designed to give the U.S. the option at any point to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not"—as if Camelot's best and brightest could precisely calibrate the pace of conflict and escalation.

In April 1965, a month after the launching of "Rolling Thunder," the massive U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, McNamara wrote that "it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC [Viet Cong] failure." Ten years and more than 59,000 U.S. fatalities later, it became clear that the VC had never paid much attention to his delicately crafted signals and crescendos.

<link>

If you understand what was said above, then all of the bombing was purely for the purpose of getting the N. Vietnamese to change their minds and give up their inflitration of the South. But in fact all they ever had to do was wait us out. No matter what Walter Cronkite might have said, at some point we would have gotten out of Vietnam with no victory, just as eventually we are going to have to get out of Iraq with no victory.

If all a war is going to do is 'send messages' and effectively wait and hope for the other guy to quit, it is just not going to be sustainable. End of story.

Really, if all it takes for America to lose a war is for some tv anchorman to make an incorrect statement, then America was going to lose that war no matter what.

We probably COULD have won the Vietnam War militarily. But to "win" there would have meant forcing the South Vietnamese to accept a government (Catholic in a Bhuddist-majority country, full of ties to the hated, and expelled, French colonial powers) that they loathed. And that would have to be accomplished with massive brute force and have involved staying in the country for years on end.

In short, it would have required us to act just like the regimes we hated. Like the Viet Cong, Soviet toadies who masqueraded as nationalists to win over the Vietnamese population (the one positive effect of our long stay in the country is that it exhausted the VC to the point that they gave up their plans to spread Communism all over Southeast Asia--in the end, they were willing to collect the other half of the country and call it a day). The growing skepticism about the Vietnam misadventure wasn't defeatism--it was a sign that the American people still had a functioning conscience . . .

who is this kaplin ? never heard of him.

you didn't read my link did you?

you didn't read the link at all.

the buddists were aligned with the governmet after tet.

get it?

they saw what the cong were up to then.

I think a number of folks are missing the point.

It's not about opposition to/support of the Vietnam War. It's about the truth.

Cronkite lied. Period.

As a journalist, you can't claim to be acting honorably when it requires that you deceive the public. There were any number of stories that Cronkite could have reported honestly that would have served to discourage the American people from pursuing the War in Vietnam. Instead, Cronkite chose to lie to the public.

Such a man is not deserving of any honor as a journalist.

Here's Cronkite's actual statement:

<link>

Tonight, back in more familiar surroundings in New York, we'd like to sum up our findings in Vietnam, an analysis that must be speculative, personal, subjective. Who won and who lost in the great Tet offensive against the cities? I'm not sure. The Vietcong did not win by a knockout, but neither did we. The referees of history may make it a draw.

....

For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.

...

Where is the lie here? There was going to be no invasion of the North, hence all the enemy had to do was outwait us.

War isn't some stupid game that can be fouled by some bad referee call, after which maybe enough whining by the fans will reverse the situation. To talk about winning and losing in war, as if it were jsut another ballgame, is in fact utterly stupid. Either you are going to defeat and subjugate the enemy or you are not going to do that. And in Vietnam we were not going to do that. All we were doing was just waiting for the other guy to give up before American patience with the whole adventure ran out. And that was just not a sustainable strategy in the long run.

It appears to me that Walter Cronkite simply recognized that fact. I say he just told the truth and you don't like it. So, no, it wasn't a 'lie, period.

What you miss is that the Vietnamese had never accepted the division of their country. We were fighting against people who were defending their homes and their land....at least that was their view. It wasn't like the Korean war. The South Koreans were willing to fight to keep the communists out of the south. The Vietnamese, by and large, were not. The evidence is this. As your post states, the South had an army of nearly 1 million soldiers. It fell apart when we left. They sold their weapons to the VC and ran away. The generals kept the money they should have been paying the troops with. They never thought of the war as their own. The "ruling class" were on our side, but for the most part the peasants were not.

Cronkite merely stated his opinion. How can an opinion be a lie?

i don't think you read anything that i posted. you couldn't have for it shows that the tet offensive was not a stalemate as cronkite had said. the combined south vietnamese - american military had been victorious over the viet cong. to portray that as a stalemate is a lie.

you didn't read a thing that i posted your replyied with your opinion on the war over all not the tet offensive. the reality is that the tet offensive was won by the combined south vietnamese - american forces including the rural population.

won get it? it wasn't a stalemate tet was a victory except in cronkite's eyes. cronkite called a victory a stalemate that is a lie.

even the buddists were anticong at that time. it was in the seven years after cronkite's statement that the situation deteriorated into to what you describe. and cronkite helped in a big way to cause that.

But it didn't matter that the Viet Cong was pushed back or defeated in the Tet Offensive. It didn't matter as far as WINNING THE WAR. So it was a stalemate.

WINNING THE WAR depended on the OTHER GUY QUITTING. That the was the entire strategy. The Tet Offensive showed the other guy wasn't quitting. Since we weren't going to invade the north, there was no other strategy and the war was as good as lost.

We thought the Viet Cong couldn't mount something like the Tet offensive. But they did. You say they were defeated. But that was the claim before the Tet offensive. So the defeat was only temporary and other Tet offensives could and would be mounted. It exposed the US strategy as bankrupt.

That was how Cronkite viewed it and I believe he was right.

RIght, it was all Cronkite's doing. You should read Cronkite's statement again. I was drafted in 1972 and we were already pulling out. Richard Nixon had run on a platform of getting American soldiers out of Vietnam....remember his "peace with honor" bullshit?

The war was a stalemate. You think there was a good reason to continue to fight against allowing the Vietnamese to run their own country? You think the "budhists" were anti-cong....who do you think was killing American soldiers if it wasn't budhists?

To the average Vietnames it was a choice between the corrupt government in Siagon and the communists in Hanoi.

Tet was a victory in the body count. It did not change things as far as the North was concerned. They'd have fought on for a hundred years. The only way to change that would have been to invade the north.