Disbanding Old Iraqi Army

While maintaining the Old Iraqi Army might have prevented some Sunni insurgents by keeping them in uniform, I think we would have had an even greater problem had we tried to sustain it.

It was the power most closely associated with Sunni dominance, and I think it is likely that we would have had a larger Shia problem, sooner, had we tried to keep it intact. I don't think Sistani would have found that acceptable. Sistani is still the best friend we have here by not demanding a Shiite only government, and allowing the attempt at a national coalition government. He may not like us, but he could make this a very different, much more difficult and bloody war.

Destroying Iraqi Army

If there was a policy decision regarding the Old Iraqi Army that set us up for the insurgency, it was not destroying the Old Iraqi military in detail, leaving hundreds of thousands of young men available for the insurgency. We bypassed whole units rather than destroy them. If you compare to successful occupations by the US, one of the differences is a lack of surviving military age men at the beginning of the occupation. We like to think we are in a new stage of warfare, but when it comes to "boots on the ground" occupation, I think some old rules still apply, and one is you have to defeat a population before you occupy them.

So from a policy perspective and assuming we wanted to do what is best for Iraq in the long run, would it have been better to eliminate their fighters before occupying, but also eliminate the same population that provide manpower and work, or is it better to have an insurgency for a few years that leaves a larger post war work force? We know the damage caused by the second choice, but I don't know that we have a picture of what Iraq would have been like with the first.

Gratuitously continuing to fight against an army that has no real ability to defend itself is not a pleasant thought, but all it would have really required was to slow the invasion down, eradicate units we bypassed, and let the Iraqi's grind themselves down against the invading divisions...but at a greater cost in US lives at the beginning of the war, rather than losing them now...and since we can't be certain of the future, the choice to reduce US casualties early at the risk of some future threat is pretty forgivable.

I don't think we had good choices. One might have been "militarily sound" but politically disastrous causing a different insurgency, the other a humanitarian nightmare but probably the only effective way to tamp down a pending insurgency.

One "good choice" that was available was to not invade in the first place.

But once that decision was made, I don't think the follow on decisions are especially clearcut.

Might I remind you that Gen. Shinseki wanted 300,000 boots on the ground until he was replaced by the BUSH administration. Again, whose fault was that??

I also don't take as gospel that the number of troops was too few. Invading with more troops then we did might have prevented the insurgency, but I don't know of any data that shows that an extra 100 thousand soldiers would have done that: all it would have done in my opinion is change the current complaint to say we should have invaded with fewer troops so we did not appear to be occupiers. It would have been unsustainable, burned out the military faster, and when we reduced from the unsustainable number in 2004 we would have been "cutting and running" and "abandoning Iraq" just getting to the numbers we have in country now. While we might have been able to protect some national treasures and prevent looting of some arms stores, much of the ordinance was already strewn about the country and stored locally when we got here.

Invading with more troops would have reduced our capacity to continue the occupation. If there is someone to blame for putting us in the position to be unable to sustain 300,000 troops, it would be those who dropped us from a 750,000 man army in 1990 to 480,000 in 2000.

Excellent reply. Keep'em coming! I think the arguments against your posts have more to do with attempts at being witty and coming up with great one-liners than actually presenting an argument worth considering. You do them all a service with your replies...and I notice the dwindling to non-existant retorts.

Hard to argue with one whose boots are on the ground. Was just reading in the paper today concerning the media and it's reporting on Iraq. Concern being, why the lack of reporting on all the small victories in Iraq and only focusing on the tragedies? Too many of the naysayers and polticians would rather just walk away from the good we are doing in Iraq, and don't have a clue what it would really take to restore America's image in the world. I just fail to see the benefits for the American image that a retreat would create. I can see Iraq as being just another nation America has let down if we do decide to leave it in it's current disheveled state. If image is our concern...but I would rather we just do what is right by the people most affected by our venture into Iraq.

"I don't think we had good choices," indeed. Starting with the utterly foolish, dishonest, and deadly choice to aggressively invade Iraq to START with.

Your suggestion of mass murder as a potential 'strategy' is shameful.

Clearly not a change in government via foreign invasion, but the situation was similar in that the white (5%) population filled the police and military which inflicted decades of brutal opression and torture on the millions of black Saffies.

The police and national defence force was the instrument of Apartheid similar to the Iraqi Army/Police as the instrument of Baathist rule.

But in SA, the majority of operating police and military folks were not 'gungho' supremacists inflicting torture, pain and death for the heck of it. They minimized it as much as they could without losing their jobs or ending up in prison themselves (ultra-whites were supremely harsh on white sympathizers and treated them as if black). And they are also generally very good at following orders, since military/police are authoritarian-loving by nature, regardless of who is giving them.

So when the government changed hands to ANC, they continued to enforce the laws of land, re: drink driving, robbery, assaults, drug smuggling, etc. and simply stopped rounding up black activists or enforcing apartheid-era laws until they were officially off the books - as directed by new government.

This was similar to Baathists and army/police in Iraq - some of which are/were Shia, btw. Had the Baathists remained employed and paid with watchful Americans approving the orders and decries of ministries to ensure that Shia oppression by majority-Baath ministries stopped right away but that government/society/economy continued functioning. Until a joint Shia/Kurd/Sunni T&R Commission could interview and boot or keep ministry officials.

Likewise in the Army, the troops would have been under the watchful eyes of US Generals and per-unit embeds of US watchers ensuring that there weren't any 'on-the-way-out' attacks against Shia for being Shia and with constant communication with local Shia/Sunni tribal/religious leaders. The generals would focus IDF on borders to keep foreign jihadists/weapons out.

Civilian experts and Amry, Marince MPs would work with police on (a) rounding up all of the prisoners Hussein released the days before/during the invasion and (b) restore order. Again with by-unit embeds and daily communication with Shia/Sunni tribal/religious leaders until the TRC could expell baddies and until a newly constitutionally recognized government was in place, then it was their problem.

Sheer anarchy by disbanding government ministries (with experienced career employees) and the army/police (with questionable loyalty but well trained units) was never a good option.

Monitoring police/army 'on the payroll' and kicking out baddies would have been heaps easier than kicking them all out where there is no supervision or contact and trying to reconstitute from scratch.

Had there been any post-war planning, 're-doctrination' boot-camps would have been set up to retrain police and army on how to respect other tribes and demonstrating the consequences to bad actors.

"Trust, but verify" should have been the motto.

oh4real

The calculation for 300K+ was made based on what it took when occupying the Balkans based on population numbers - and that was an easier population to manage than Iraqis.

oh4real

clown_nose:

I also don't take as gospel that the number of troops was too few. Invading with more troops then we did might have prevented the insurgency, but I don't know of any data that shows that an extra 100 thousand soldiers would have done that: all it would have done in my opinion is change the current complaint to say we should have invaded with fewer troops so we did not appear to be occupiers.

It is ridiculous to imply that we "do not look like an occupying force in Iraq" because we have only 120,000 soldiers there instead of 300,000.

It would have been unsustainable, burned out the military faster, and when we reduced from the unsustainable number in 2004 we would have been "cutting and running" and "abandoning Iraq" just getting to the numbers we have in country now. While we might have been able to protect some national treasures and prevent looting of some arms stores, much of the ordinance was already strewn about the country and stored locally when we got here.

Invading with more troops would have reduced our capacity to continue the occupation. If there is someone to blame for putting us in the position to be unable to sustain 300,000 troops, it would be those who dropped us from a 750,000 man army in 1990 to 480,000 in 2000.

It seems as if you wish to assign blame to the Clinton administration with this statement. Reducing the size of our military force was not Clinton's idea. Whether you think that it was wise or foolish, this process began under the Reagan administration and was still held dear by Rumsfeld up until his resignation.

Heartless as it may sound, you are correct in your previous suggestion that actually physically destroying the Iraqi Army would have been a better tactic than simply disbanding the military. What really baffles me is why we neglected to destroy the various ammunition dumps.

I just wanted to amplify one aspect of oh4real's nicely detailed reply - it's my opinion that retaining the original Army structure would permit enforcing control over materiel with Saddam-era discipline. Doing so would have had the potential to significantly reduce the availability of resources used for the IED's that have been so damaging to the U.S. armed forces' post-invasion operations.

when you'd slip up and reveal your true colors here as you have done in Ballot Box.

"If there is someone to blame for putting us in the position to be unable to sustain 300,000 troops, it would be those who dropped us from a 750,000 man army in 1990 to 480,000 in 2000."

RIGHT! All together now people of the glorious far Right in this nation. IT IS ALL CLINTON's FAULT!

Cute.

Ahem, do you know the background of the general that you are dismissing as lacking in statistical data? Hell, for that matter, I wonder if Bush and Rumsfeld knew it when they retired him because he wouldn't shut up and play politics with the lives of his military personnel or with the military itself?

Yes, credible military experts do agree that massive numbers of boots on the ground not only would have allowed us to speedily take the nation, but then to properly occupy it, secure the national boundaries and smash any terrorist groups as they arose. That's basic and fundamental military military tactics. BASIC STUFF.

So let's get this straight here and now, Bush and his group of amateur generals screwed up royally in Iraq by trying to run the operation like it was a business venture -- do it on the personnel cheap, under equip them, farm everything out to civilian groups, and hope for the freaking best.

The rest is history, and no matter how much stealthy little con-apologists like you attempt to revise history too damn many people now know and understand precisely what happened in Iraq and precisely which president is the most foolish person ever to occupy the Oval Office; and it's NOT Bill Clinton.

nothing like laying a foundation on mud, no?

clown_nose wrote the following post at 09/08/2007 4:44 AM:

Disbanding Old Iraqi Army

While maintaining the Old Iraqi Army might have prevented some Sunni insurgents by keeping them in uniform, I think we would have had an even greater problem had we tried to sustain it.

It was the power most closely associated with Sunni dominance, and I think it is likely that we would have had a larger Shia problem, sooner, had we tried to keep it intact. I don't think Sistani would have found that acceptable. Sistani is still the best friend we have here by not demanding a Shiite only government, and allowing the attempt at a national coalition government. He may not like us, but he could make this a very different, much more difficult and bloody war.

Destroying Iraqi Army

If there was a policy decision regarding the Old Iraqi Army that set us up for the insurgency, it was not destroying the Old Iraqi military in detail, leaving hundreds of thousands of young men available for the insurgency. We bypassed whole units rather than destroy them. If you compare to successful occupations by the US, one of the differences is a lack of surviving military age men at the beginning of the occupation. We like to think we are in a new stage of warfare, but when it comes to "boots on the ground" occupation, I think some old rules still apply, and one is you have to defeat a population before you occupy them.

So from a policy perspective and assuming we wanted to do what is best for Iraq in the long run, would it have been better to eliminate their fighters before occupying, but also eliminate the same population that provide manpower and work, or is it better to have an insurgency for a few years that leaves a larger post war work force? We know the damage caused by the second choice, but I don't know that we have a picture of what Iraq would have been like with the first.

>>>>>>>oh it's really too bad you weren't allowed more Fallujah's no, where you could keep the men from 15 to 55 from leaving, and then bomb and shell the bejesus outta them? Was that the plan behind that particular war crime?

Gratuitously continuing to fight against an army that has no real ability to defend itself is not a pleasant thought, but all it would have really required was to slow the invasion down, eradicate units we bypassed, and let the Iraqi's grind themselves down against the invading divisions...but at a greater cost in US lives at the beginning of the war, rather than losing them now...and since we can't be certain of the future, the choice to reduce US casualties early at the risk of some future threat is pretty forgivable.

>>>>>>>>>>>oh­ love for bloodshed seems to be creeping out. Are you actually suggesting that those Iraqi soldiers wouldn't have laid down there arms, or are you suggesting they should have been killed even if they did?

I don't think we had good choices. One might have been "militarily sound" but politically disastrous causing a different insurgency, the other a humanitarian nightmare but probably the only effective way to tamp down a pending insurgency.

>>>>>>>>>In­ other words, kill as many as needed to give them democracy? You seem to be quite generous with their freedom to die.

You clowns slay me--- not a single stinking word in here about concern for the Iraqi people or their society, just "how best" to make compliant sheep outta them, after illegally and immorally invading them.

That "old Iraqi Army is what stood between a Laic independent Iraqi state & the present Shiite pro Iranian government click.

Sad.

Best Regards

Lobato1

"If there is someone to blame for putting us in the position to be unable to sustain 300,000 troops, it would be those who dropped us from a 750,000 man army in 1990 to 480,000 in 2000."

The same people who successfully kept Saddam in a box and the Iranis at bay.

As for what to do with Iraq after the walkover victory against a sanction weakened foe, the earlier example of bombing Serbia silly, then pulling back to let them find a path not offensive to their neighbors is a possibility. Nation building isn't our strong suit lately due to the places we try it, Haiti and Afghanistan coming to mind, or Soviet Afghanistan for another perspective.

As for what to do with Iraq now, ethnic cleansing seems to be pointing the way to de facto partition, which will give us the chance to move back and support the Sunni against the Iranian Shia puppet government that we so kindly installed for the Ayatullahs. This will reverse roles in the proxy war and allow Iran to be drained and fragmented. Only use left in the situation.

Good post, CN. Good luck.