Maybe Noah just doesn't understand the problem...
by
lloyd667
06/05/2009, 9:05 AM #
The problem, Tim, is that if banks are TBTF then, by definition, they will not be allowed to fail. Banks, knowing this, have an incentive to take risks they would otherwise not--in fact, in a competitive market, they will be forced to take such risks--because for them there is little downside.
For a long time it was thought in the US that the solution was to have lots of small banks, so none would be TBTF. Recent events have shown that this strategy doesn't work. So, what to do?
The government could break up all the banks, so that none would be TBTF. There is no chance of this happening. Apart from the political and legal barriers, it is not clear that such small banks can really be competitive these days. As a result, banks will grow again.
The government could announce that it will never again bail out banks; in effect, say that no bank is TBTF. This would not be credible, certainly not to the big banks, which know better. Thus, the problem would remain.
So, Greenspan is right. This is a problem that cannot go away.
But, Tim, you have stumbled onto the solution. Stricter regulation of banks, especially banks that are TBTF. Such banks cannot be allowed to get into a position where they might fail. Put differently, the incentives for excessive risk taking need to be offset by stricter regulation. This, in essence, was the solution to the S&L crisis of the previous generation. In that case, the bad incentives induced by deposit insurance, which like TBTF caused institutions to take big risks but which could not credibly be withdrawn, were offset by stricter regulation.