As the article pointed out, the Falkands war probably secured the islands financial future and ensured that what was previously a fairly insular community would receive enough new blood to stop them all growing 6 toes on each foot.

It also shows why Argentinia would never, despite years of neglect from the british government, convince the islanders that their future lay with Buenos Aires.

The Falklands Islands may lie only a couple of hundred miles of the coast of Argentina but their soul has always been English (even if it is an Englishness that only exists in Miss Marple stories).

The law of unintended consequences worked both ways in '82. It's highly unlikely that democracy would have returned to Argentina in October of 1983 without the defeat in the Falklands. Galtieri thought (in his drunken haze) that a common external enemy would equal national unity, giving the military regime enough oxygen to rule Argentina for another decade or so. Operation Rosario was, instead, the beginning of the end for him and for the junta. Granted, Argentina is still a craphole in terms of public policies and macroeconomic management, but at least there are no clandestine torture centers any more.

I also like the fact that Argentina expected much support for its neighbours against the "colonial" power but most its its neighbours (and especially Chile) were more than happy to see Agentina taken down a peg or two.

Indeed. Chile and Argentine barely avoided war in '79 and '81, so it made sense for Pinochet's government to provide some support for the UK. As for the rest of Latin America, their support of Argentina was almost purely symbolic. One of the popular jokes at the time was about land-locked Bolivia's pledge to support Argentina with all their naval resources (e.g. fake headlines like 'Bolivian Admiral sent to Rio Gallegos') .

Not that any other form of support would have made any difference at all, given the state of Latin American armed forces back then. A chain is as strong as the weakest of its links, after all.