I think there might be something to the "Big Sort" theory (as discussed in a current Slate guest blog), that as people are are choosing to live in more politically homogeneous districts, politics in these districts are getting further away from the center. I think this last election emphasized recent Republican successes were more dependent on this geographical polarization than on broader appeal Reagan was able to muster accross the country.
The effects of the sorting (if they are indeed due to geographic sorting) seems more obvious on the right, because the left has been playing it safer, trying to take back the center for the better part of 16 years from the Gingrich congress and the the Bush / DeLay machine.If you're whole world is Sugarland Texas and the Jack Abramoff / the Republican majority on Capital Hill, pretty soon you start thinking like Tom DeLay and become a little politically tone-deaf. I wonder if Rove, with his much less parlochial view as national vote counter for the party, foresaw that his own strategy of squeaking out electoral college victories based on more homogenous Republican strongholds was about to run out of gas...once the breeze starts blowing even gently against you in Ohio and Florida, your goose is cooked with the Rove strategy, it seems.
I think what this dialogue has sort of left mostly unmentioned is the divide between how Republicans will campaign in 2010 and beyond, and how they will govern should they find themselves back in power.
As I wrote in an earlier Fray post, I think a lot of the old campaign tactics will resurface because, in certain areas, they just work. When you have pissed off lower class whites in hard-hit rural economies, you have to rechannel the natural economic class tensions into something that works for you as a rich, connected fat-cat politician, and that something is usually race or cultural "otherness".
What I think won't be tolerated as much by Republicans of their next president, once they get him or her elected, is 1.) cowboy diplomacy (they'll still be quicker to use military force than liberals, but they probably will be less likely to start wars that have no exit strategy and unleash ethnic hostilities that have been long suppressed) 2.) the vastly expanded powers of the executive and disregard for the rule of law we've seen under Bush 3.) tolerance of "loyalty machines" that continue to spin out of control long after its obvious that cabinet secretaries or others need to be replaced (Rumsfeld, Brownie, etc.). I think they'll raise more hell, put more pressure on the White House to pink slip people who are failing big time or made huge decisions that backfired.
The rhetorhical direction being debated in the Slate dialog is important, but there won't be any one ideological master plan that will result in the banishment of social conservatives or the libertarian wing or anything. I think, after spending most of my life under Republicans and centrist democrats who are consistently outmaneuvered by Republicans, that rumors of the death of Gingrich conservatism, Reagan conservatism, etc. are greatly exaggerated.
Like many people have said, 52% is no landslide. There are still a LOT of voters who will more or less respond to the same brand of conservative we know as long as the officeholders show more competence (which in Bush's case would have meant quietly abandoning things like free market fundamentalism and reigning in Wall Street before it was too late). In the end, Bush did abandon lots of conservatives principles, but had things turned out better, none of his anti-conservative moves would have cost the party much (I'm thinking of the bailouts, pre-emptive war, the medicare drug benefit, and Homeland Security which, while effective in keeping us safe, has been a classic example of big government and pork-barrell politics). The swing voters really don't care about the ideological heresies. They just react to the bad news or the lack of it. (Except in 2004...what the hell happened there?)