This article brings up a good point but just misses exploring a key part of it.

The point: Leaders are going to have some view about what the odds of success for the surge are and what the costs are. Examples in the article are odds of success 1 in 10 and costs of 700 to 1,000 additional US soldiers killed.

Now, it touches on the other side in that it says that pulling out has a cost too in that "sectarian warfare would probably intensify." We can assume that failing at surge (the 9 in 10 odds speculated about) also has this cost or a similar one.

What's missing: There is not an actual example of what the cost of pulling out/losing is with the requisite "sectarian warfare". Let's make some up: 10,000 Iraqi dead? 50,000? 100,000? 200,000? What about the ultimate consequence to US interests? Is pulling out more likely to cause the US's enemies to make peace or to fight harder in a new location?

My speculations would be:

1. Most US citizens would say that American lives are more valuable than Iraqi lives and so the cost of pullout is perceived to be lower. Thus the desire for pullout. Personally, having lived through the 1970's when millions of people were killed after the US pullout from SE Asia, I'm not down with that. Particularly when US causalty levels in the Iraq War are very low by any definition of war.

2. Pulling out is not likely to cause the US's enemies to stop fighting and make peace. The war will continue in some other form and theater after a pullout.

3. I think the odds of success for the surge are greater than 10% and actually go up the longer the US stays. Perceptions of early withdrawal are a key part of the insurgent strategy. Knowledge that withdrawal is not forthcoming creates an insurmountable problem. The insurgents simply have zero capacity to force the US to leave if the US doesn't want to. Truly, zero capacity.

So, the US should stay and more Iraqis get to live.

About that #3 - you and W obviously agree! Stay the course and maybe increase the odds to 20% or even 30% chance of success! (That's a 90% to 70% chance of failure, btw - slim odds, for a worthless enterprise.)

Maybe you or your offspring should volunteer to be part of the surge, since you think we should be there forever, and there's no chance that we'll ever be forced out. I'm all for people like you to be part of history! (I'd be happy if you even donated a good portion of your income to help defer the cost of this war - a couple ten thousand sounds like a good start.)

On #2, I certainly agree - anti-US sentiment and actions in the Middle East and the rest of the world would not stop if the US pulled out of Iraq. However, this is an irrelevant point and nobody has suggested as such. Anti-US sentiment would probably drop noticeably, but perhaps not significantly in the short term. In the long-term (years to decades) a US pullout would reduce anti-US sentiment more significantly provided the US doesn't invade another country pre-emptively.

A more relevant question is, "Does the US have a strategic advantage in maintaining a presence in Iraq?" At current troop levels, I would say no. Given that US troops are attempting to do the job expected of any effective Iraqi security force and not making progress, the troops in Iraq are not available for projecting force even towards Iraq's neighbors.

Also, in terms of the effects of a US pull-out, one should compare Iraq pre-invasion and post-pull-out rather than pre- and post-pull-out. The question here should be, "If the US pulls out, is Iraq worse off than under Saddam?"

Re: #3: the longer the U.S. stays, the move overtaxed our military becomes. We don't have enough troops to keep this up, all we are doing is compromising our readiness for future conflicts. The damage this whole thing has done, in terms of encouraging people to leave the service when they may have considered lifetime service, and new recruitment, will be felt for DECADES.

"So, the US should stay and more Iraqis get to live."

Admirable sentiment. All that's required is the institution of a draft and confiscatory tax rates on the rich and the corporations.
I'm down with that. Party on!

I get the notion from your post that you are neither rich, nor of draft age....

A convenient idea you have....what do you have to lose? Blame others for their financial success and commit others to risks you would rather not partake. No desire for personal accountability and risk averse...much easier to spend what isn't yours and have others do what you aren't willing.

You're making HUGE assumptions about the good that would come from staying. Why assume that another 50,000 dead in Viet Nam would have prevented the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia? How exactly would that have worked? If the British had stayed in India after WWII, would the eventual partition have been any less violent?

The British stayed in Iraq for 30 years, and yet we have the present situation. Those folks are fighting battles with 1,200 years of history behind them.

Do we really want to spend 1,000 lives a year and destroy the volunteer army, to referee them?

Dan_O:

3. I think the odds of success for the surge are greater than 10% and actually go up the longer the US stays. Perceptions of early withdrawal are a key part of the insurgent strategy. Knowledge that withdrawal is not forthcoming creates an insurmountable problem. The insurgents simply have zero capacity to force the US to leave if the US doesn't want to. Truly, zero capacity.

So, the US should stay and more Iraqis get to live.

That strategy didn't work out too well in Vietnam, did it? The notion that if the U.S. just stays these people will eventually give up fighting and work out their differences would require a continuing US presence for decades. Just look at S.E. Asia, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, East Timor, and Eritrea for examples. Do you really think we have the staying power to fight the Iraqi insurgents for the next thirty years?

Aagcobb:

Dan_O:

3. I think the odds of success for the surge are greater than 10% and actually go up the longer the US stays. Perceptions of early withdrawal are a key part of the insurgent strategy. Knowledge that withdrawal is not forthcoming creates an insurmountable problem. The insurgents simply have zero capacity to force the US to leave if the US doesn't want to. Truly, zero capacity.

So, the US should stay and more Iraqis get to live.

That strategy didn't work out too well in Vietnam, did it? The notion that if the U.S. just stays these people will eventually give up fighting and work out their differences would require a continuing US presence for decades. Just look at S.E. Asia, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, East Timor, and Eritrea for examples. Do you really think we have the staying power to fight the Iraqi insurgents for the next thirty years?

No. The thing you are overlooking is, we could win. We don't have to just hang around.

Dan_O: I can appreciate the fact that you have given this very untenable situation some honest thought, but I believe your basic logic and subsequent conclusions have some fundamental flaws.

1) You are willing to play the odds that clearly are not very good, which is agreed on by a clear consensus even in this administration. Even if the 10 percent chance of success was bumped up to say 30 percent, which is a bit of a stretch, the odds of success remain poor. I would highly recommend you say away from Vegas.

2) Staying the course in Iraq is completely contingent upon our military's ability to maintain enough of a presence there to effect change. According to Colin Powell, someone who is eminently qualified to speak on this subject, the Pentagon will be forced to begin a withdrawal of troops sometime in 2008 simply based on the current numbers available in the Army and Marine Corps, and the available equipment in their inventory. This situation is completely un-related to any potential Congressional action. This makes the issue of maintaining a viable presence in Iraq, i.e., enough troop strength to effect change, a moot point. The only thing that would have any dramatic affect on this situation would be the adoption of a draft and a huge build up of equipment and arms, and that is highly unlikely under this administration. Perhaps you or someone in your family could volunteer to maintain our presence there.

3) History shows that the longer an occupying force maintains a presence in a hostile environment the more the situation degenerates and foments more hostilities. We left Viet Nam far too late, and the brutal purges in Cambodia most likely would have occurred under any circumstances. We couldn't maintain Nam, what makes you think we could have done anything about Cambodia. The British learned this the hard way in Iraq in the early 20th century, as did the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 80s. (with a little help from the U.S.). The sectarian violence will continue whether U.S forces remain in Iraq or they leave. The only difference will be the continued toll of American troops. Additionally, the odds are probably even that regional Middle East countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, etc. will want to bring stability to Iraq versus perpetuating more violence. It is in their interest to try and stabilize the region. We can leave now and concede that Iraq was a monumental clusterfuck, or we can leave in 5-10 years, and concede that Iraq was a monumental clusterfuck. The difference will be many more American lives and Iraqi lives.

....Knowledge that withdrawal is not forthcoming creates an insurmountable problem. The insurgents simply have zero capacity to force the US to leave if the US doesn't want to. Truly, zero capacity.... LOL! Insurmountable, eh? I have no doubt that hey'll just keeping shooting at us, whether we leave or not, for 10, 20 or 30 years. Why wouldn't they? If a foreign army illegally invaded the United States, I'd try to kill them, too--wouldn't you? So what difference does it make if they can't force the U.S. to leave--that's kind of the situation we have now, isn't it? And how's that look to you?

[If a foreign army illegally invaded the United States, I'd try to kill them, too--wouldn't you?]

Of course I would.

But when the French army "invaded" america during the revolution and stuck around long enough for us to get a representative republic set up, that was a bit different.

For one thing, they didn't try to impose their chosen form of government (a monarchy at the time) on us.

They also didn't take it upon themselves to police the American populace -- nor did they lock up thousands of Americans on spurious (or non-existant) evidence, and then torture them.

Of course, the Frogs later made all those mistakes (and a lot more) in Algeria and Indochina...

[But when the French army "invaded" america during the revolution...]

Um, nice try. The French army never entered America at all during the Revolutionary War. Their NAVY aided us immensely, and they lent us a few officers, but that's it.

True Conservative, you truly make no sense. You have made 2 brief posts here which assert that

1. Unlike vietnam, we can win in Iraq

2. The French invaded the US during the revolutionary war, and stuck around, helping us to usher in our democratic government, and its totally analogous to Iraq now.

so,

1. Define winning. Seriously. The country becomes a functioning democracy? We manage to replace hundreds of years of localist tradition and religion with a spirit of embrace for modernism and democratic debate? We can disarm militias that are more popular than either the US or the "iraqi army" there? Or maybe you mean we can defeat AQI, who represents 1 of many threats to iraqi stability and did not exist as an organization before we invaded? Which of these do you mean? And how will staying longer increase our popularity there? Do you think that we don't need to be popular there to win?

2. Where to begin? Firstly, we formed an alliance with france, and asked them to assist us. Their military contributions were mostly at sea, and the troops they did send did not, in any interpretation of the word, form an "occupation." (maybe I misread you and you brought this up as a joke?) Either way, its always great to see someone make an analogy to a different war, 230 years ago, on a different continent, on different terms, between different people, for different reasons, and call it valid.