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Scalia, Lawrence and the true breadth of "dignity"
by Joe_JP

Scalia was on Charlie Rose last night (don't worry; I didn't watch either) and we have a piece on the legacy of Lawrence v. Texas. Well, excuse enough ...

When he feels that the Constitution guarantees it, Justice Scalia can be quite eloquent about upholding liberties, no matter how unpopular the litigants. This includes flag burners, alleged child molesters who want to confront their accusers, American citizens (as compared to alien) held as enemy combatants without redress to the courts and those whom "a state court found mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct that trial himself" who wish all the same to go it alone.

This last one was addressed by a recent case decided by the Supreme Court, in which a 7-2 (Scalia/Thomas) majority held "whether a defendant who is represented by counsel can proceed to trial and whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself" can be two different things. IOW, the fact a person is competent to stand trial might not mean s/he is competent to go it alone.

Scalia disagreed with the majority, in part disputing what "dignity" for the accused here means. The majority in part focused on the fairness of the trial, including appearance of unfairness, and the accused embarassing him/herself. But, not just that, clearly. The whole whole case was also based on the idea the accused was not competent enough to waive counsel. It was not just about them looking bad.

Anyway, this all led to this by Scalia, with all the quotes/cites removed:

Rather, the dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of individual choice. The Sixth Amendment’s counsel clause should not be invoked to impair the exercise of [the defendant’s] free choice to dispense with the right for whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice. Nine years later, when we wrote that the self-representation right served the dignity and autonomy of the accused, we explained in no uncertain terms that this meant according every defendant the right to his say in court. In particular, we said that individual dignity and autonomy barred standby counsel from participating in a manner that would to destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself, and meant that the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury.

Lawrence v. Texas comes in here because it is based in part on the "master of one’s fate" theme. This is what privacy rights are all about -- not just seclusion, but in the words of former Reagan man (this suggests how a Reagan appointee can write Lawrence):

What a person is, what he wants, the determination of his life plan, of his concept of the good, are the most intimate expressions of self-determination, and, by asserting a person's responsibility for the results of this self-determination, we give substance to the concept of liberty.

Where's the connect to a right to counsel case, one might ask. Well, first, the issue is not totally specific to the Sixth Amendment. The amendment guarantees the right to counsel. Does this literally by the words themselves mean you also can refuse one, even if in the process the fairness of the trial will be in jeopardy? In fact, Scalia once noted that the right of refusal is probably more of a "due process" right, a more open-ended affair. Anyway, as to state trials, the Fourteenth Amendment only speaks to broad due process rights and privileges and immunities.

More importantly, our constitutional system is based on certain broad themes (including checks and balances, separation of powers, individual rights) that go above and beyond the concrete provisions found in the document. We can't ignore the provisions in support of open-end things like "fairness." But, equally, we cannot ignore the themes. In fact, concrete provisions tell us just that ("concrete" as in by the force of the words -- the Ninth Amendment, let's say).

Scalia thinks this opens us to arbitrary judicial control. But, to cite Justice Harlan (a judicial mentor of sorts to key justices), "having regard to what history teaches" is a core measure in determining the breadth of our constitutional rights. It is not only a matter of looking at specific liberties ("a series of isolated points"), but the underlining principles too. Such as "dignity"and so forth.

Going back to Lawrence, the individual holding is important, but even more so is the principles upheld. Let it be noted the same author wrote the recent 5-4 (Lawrence was 6-3, though his opinion only had support of five) ruling on habeas corpus, also declaring the importance of basic constitutional values, including checks necessary for liberty.

I see it as something of a piece, why even though Kennedy will disappoint, his is an important line all the same.

All modern day dictators claimed this...
by gringo_911

"having regard to what history teaches"

This is what all 20 century dictators claimed. Some of them claimed naziism and anti-semitism was the only way for the german nation, and that this was what history taught us. Some of them said the same thing about communism. With so many people purported to speak on behalf of history, the judges would be well advised to limit themselves to following the Constitution, and stop worrying about history.

Re: All modern day dictators claimed this...
by Joe_JP

How does one "limit themselves to following the Constitution" without <i>in part</i> looking to see how it was carried forth through our history and the history that defines its terms? The italics is important, since some ignore that people don't just rely on that, but on specific constitutional demands etc.

Let's take the First Amendment. How does one "follow" it in a vacuum w/o looking at its purposes and what history teaches? More so things like "due process" that um historically is a developing thing that in part was informed by the history of legal processes.

Thus, one would be hard pressed to find judges and justices, of all stripes, who does not in part use history in their arsenal. The fact fire is misused by by arsonists does mean its use is illegimate across the board.

-j

"history lessons" vs. precedents...
by gringo_911
It's not surprising that instead of using somewhat conventional and boring term "precedents", or "historically accurate interpretation of the Constitution" you opted for a totalitarian term "what history teaches us". It's one thing to say that a particular law at the time when it was written meant particular thing (take "cruel and unusual punishment" for example) - and therefore any analysis of constitutionality of the laws on punishement must be done based on the historically accurate understanding of the meaning of the law, not what today some people would consider to be "cruel and unusual punishment". But again, such interpretation leaves very little in analyzing what "history teaches us". In other words, you want the judges to use the tea leaves of "history lessons" as a cover for their desire to interpret the laws based on their personal preferences.
Precedents that uses history etc.
by Joe_JP

It's not surprising that instead of using somewhat conventional and boring term "precedents", or "historically accurate interpretation of the Constitution" you opted for a totalitarian term "what history teaches us".

"Not surprising" in what sense? Based on your stereotypes on my position?

I said it "what history teaches us" is part of the equation. I emphasized the part to make clear that I don't use history in a vacuum but as a means to help determine what the Constitution means. Or, if you like, a "historically accurate" (I don't want to be "taught" "inaccurate" things) interpretation of the Constitution. The "precedent" btw also uses history, that is, case law is fill with cases that use history in part to clarify what the Constitution means. How my wording is somehow some dangerous talisman is unclear.

It's one thing to say that a particular law at the time when it was written meant particular thing (take "cruel and unusual punishment" for example) - and therefore any analysis of constitutionality of the laws on punishement must be done based on the historically accurate understanding of the meaning of the law, not what today some people would consider to be "cruel and unusual punishment".

The Constitution isn't just "a law." It is a framework of government that in our case involves broad terms that should not be treated just like a statutory code. Or, at least, John Marshall (a ratifier of the Constitution) and James Madison (e.g., at first against a national bank, but accepting in part that the lessons of history accepted it while the text did not compel otherwise) argued as such.

The 8A says "cruel and unusual." If it said "what was deemed as such by us who wrote and ratified this amendment" fine. It does not. "Due process." What does that mean? For centuries before 1776, it meant procedures and liberties that was developed over history. It is not originalist, to ignore such things. Orwellian doublespeak that suggests language says what is does not is also -- to take an exagerration -- the work of tyrants.

But again, such interpretation leaves very little in analyzing what "history teaches us". In other words, you want the judges to use the tea leaves of "history lessons" as a cover for their desire to interpret the laws based on their personal preferences.

You might infer that, but that is not what I said. It is useful to underline that you would be hardpressed to find a judge that does not use what "history teaches us" as a factor in judging the meaning of constitutional terms. Scalia and Brennan, etc. It is useful to imply that I said that alone is the test. Helps to twist my words. But, I didn't.

But, how exactly does one determine various broad open ended terms without in some fashion understanding how they were applied over time? How history determined they were upheld? It is folly to ignore the lessons of our past. And, since it is not the only tool in my belt, when practice violates constitutional requirements (e.g., segregation), it isn't a straightjacket by any means.

-j

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