It's clear that neither a military tribunal nor a civilian court with relaxed procedural protections is perfect for trying terrorism suspects. However, from both formalist and functionalist constitutional standpoints, a civilian court with relaxed procedural protections is the superior (or less inferior?) option. The separation of powers envisages the judicial branch trying the cases, with the executive branch seeking prosecution within the civilian courts. Allowing the executive to try the cases undermines the fundamentals of the tripartite government. The executive simply lacks the institutuional competency to be a neutral trier of fact in the same way that the judiciary can. Furthermore, from a checks and balances perspective, Madison's "ambition checking ambition" is unlikely to obtain any kind of success in a system where both the judge and the prosecution are working for the same boss. While of course there is no guarantee that a civilian judge will be impartial, our system is designed to give the maximum independence to the judicial branch, so that it can reach outcomes we see as legitimate without undue interference from interested parties (here, the executive). In the special situation of terrorist cases with highly sensitive classified evidence, some reduction of the procedural protections in a civil court may be necessary. However, from an institutional point of view, a judiciary with reduced procedural protections is more capable of turning out legitimate decisions than an executive tribunal.