Has Gemein ever been to CA?
by
bmgreene
04/15/2008, 4:04 PM #
This piece seems to be written by someone much more familiar with the CA real estate market in theory than in practice.
The biggest problem with any large-scale bailout in California is that it will artificially prop housing prices up at prices that very few residents can afford. Unless the intent is to maintain this support (at public expense) for ten or more years before incomes catch up to housing prices again, it's only delaying the inevitable.
Also, by the period he's talking about (2005-2007), the vast majority of home sales in California were to people who already owned homes, mostly these were speculators looking to flip the houses they were buying for a profit (part of why they took the ARM, teaser and Neg-Amortization loans was that they planned to have sold the houses in question by the time these loans would reset). Those intending to live in a home had laready been mostly priced out of the market, and in many cases the prospective flippers were buying from other flippers to begin with. This all had the full cooperation of many of the lenders (especially Countrywide, the more diversified banks were probably less enthusiastic) who had a business model which is largely dependent on continuous price appreciation in the collateral of their loans, also the involvement of independent mortgage brokers (many of whom have now gotten themselves retrained to be credit counselors and foreclosure specialists) who were in it for the comission on closing the deal and often left both the lender and the borrower in an untennable situation which both sides had been enthusiastic about closing.
Now that the bubble for speculators has popped, prices in California will and should continue to come down until homes become affordable to those looking to actually occupy them again. Those homeowners who chose to deliberately "cash-out" large amounts of equity which had grown in a very short time (many of these used the money either to buy expensive toys or to enter into the speculation/flipping game that helped price many people out to begin with) without considering that the prices could go back down just as fast made their own bed.
Ideas like Barney Frank's (letting courts redefine signed mortgage contracts as they are able to do with consumer debt presently) will increase lender risk, meaning higher mortgage loan rates in the future, which will have the effect of further depressing prices down the road as it will reduce the amount of principal available to borrowers for the same payment.
Lenders in this situation are no more deserving of a bailout than borrowers, as default is a known risk in lending, and everyone but the "Alt-A" lenders (who were aware of the greater risk involved in what they were doing as well) had plenty of opportunity to protect themselves from making loans which couldn't be repaid. The danger with that side of the equasion, though is that through securitization of loans and trading of bonds and derivatives, most of the financial world has some exposure to these bad loans, and may or may not know about it. At the very least, if the fallout were to lead to widespread bank failures, the pain would extend well beyond the banking corporations, and would lead to huge liabilities falling on the government through FDIC and other organizations.
The real tragedy is that so much of this came to a head during an election year, when elected officials who haven't got the real ability to do much about a lot of this are now expected to look like they're doing something, effective or not.