The only logical conclusion to the Kurd dilemma, seems, is to re-position whatever US forces we can spare to the Kurdistan border. A moment's reflection will lead to the realization that this would be merely an extension of the Clinton no-fly policy.

If there's reason to believe that Osama has agents directly under his control operating in Iraq today, well, obviously, that's a police-intelligence situation, which falls outside the purview of the 82nd Airborne's mission.

Hitchens wants to make US responsible for Iraq's fate, as if refusing a withdrawal actually constitutes anything other than delaying the inevitable self-destruction of that society, exacerbating it with American imperial soldier-martyr bait and ultimately broadening its scope and impact on the rest of the region. If anyone, Hitchens included, is serious about "saving Iraq" at this late date, let them begin by telling us where we are going to get the resources required to pacify that country.

First up: drafting and provisioning an extra 400,000 soldiers, so they have a real chance to complete a plausible mission, instead of just suffering this slow accretion of deaths as imperial soldier - martyrs.

What makes Iraq's self-destruction inevitable?

Isn't the more likely outcome something between sectarian cleansing and genocide, followed by something we really can't know? And with some help, isn't a return to the multi-ethnic recent past also possible? (Why not?)

And can't we stop the worst of it, as we have been doing?

Something between sectarian violence and genocide qualifies as social self-destruction, I'd say. And how do we know we're stoppin the worst of it? Seems more like we're just sticking fingers in various leaks in the ***.

Say in Algeria or Syria or Lebanon. And because things like the Awakening count for something.

The suicide bomber doesn't take a lot of resources/support to be effective. Thus volumes are a poor measure of anything.

A second measure is that the new strategy has resulted in a marked decline in sectarian violence where it has been applied.

Iraq is certainly no better than the other battle sites you mentioned. Probably worse.

What's the Awakening?

Here is a summary of comments by people like John Burns of the NYT and Gen. McCaffrey about actions and consequences from here. I just don't hear any serious discussion of what the Dems plan B for what happens if things go bad...

The Awakening is the name the Sunni sheiks have given their group. I mean those who have banded against al Qaeda and are sending their people to join the police and army.

Right. the Al Anbar sheikhs who've turned against AQ. So now their tribal militia gunmen are wearing Iraqi govt uniforms; a few months ago they were shooting at our soldiers. They were "bad guys"; now they're "good guys." Kind of makes a hash of the good guy/bad guy distinction - what? all of a sudden some assholes have decided that it's in their interest to play the other side of the fence and try to put AQ at arm's length. Even if we grant that this is at least a tactical victory for -- what? Sunni community cohesion? Look at what's happening in the north and you might decide that Sunni unity isn't necessarily a great advance in the overall situation -- so even if we grant that the Awakening might have a positive effect on the situation, ask yourself: was it necessary to have our soldiers there to get this big advance? Wouldn't the sheikhs have figured out that AQ was not their friend eventually on their own?

In fact, what the Awakening teaches us is that all solutions in Iraq are going to result from re-adjustments to internal Iraqi political arrangements, motivated by social and political calculations that belong entirely to the Iraqis themselves with respect to their particular ethnic and sectarian interests. The Awakening hardly sounds like the name of a party that represents liberal, democratic, secular values (the promotion of which was supposed to be the goal of our presence there); Iraq's crisis might be alleviated somewhat in the near term by phenomena similar to the Awakening, but it won't in any way resemble anything that could honestly be called "victory" for US.

MarkEHaag:

Kind of makes a hash of the good guy/bad guy distinction - what?

Not exactly. Turning live bad guys into live good guys is a whole lot better than turning them into dead bad guys.

MarkEHaag:

Even if we grant that this is at least a tactical victory for -- what? Sunni community cohesion?

That's not what either our side or their side is saying about the changes. They were quite cohesive before. Now there is at least a temporary breakdown of cohesion as the non-jihadis break away.

MarkEHaag:

even if we grant that the Awakening might have a positive effect on the situation, ask yourself: was it necessary to have our soldiers there to get this big advance?

That's what they say.

MarkEHaag:

In fact, what the Awakening teaches us is that all solutions in Iraq are going to result from re-adjustments to internal Iraqi political arrangements, motivated by social and political calculations that belong entirely to the Iraqis themselves with respect to their particular ethnic and sectarian interests.

Except that the security situation and opinions about the effectiveness of the government has a huge effect on those calculations. And at the moment, what people on the ground are saying is that if we pull back/out, the government will collapse and the Iraq-plus scenario will engage. We could easily be talking Rwanda-plus instead...

MarkEHaag:

Iraq's crisis might be alleviated somewhat in the near term by phenomena similar to the Awakening, but it won't in any way resemble anything that could honestly be called "victory" for US.

Victory will take longer than the "short term". But insurgencies can be stopped. Anbar is demonstrating that. They're now claiming that they have 1/3 of Baghdad under government/US control. That's a lot more than the 0/3 they started with in January. Sometimes you start by making a clean spot and enlarge it...

The positioning of sunni sheiks in opposition to the Al Qaeda types is a perfect example of what would happen to AQ upon withdrawal. This is in opposition to the draconian tactics used by them and a usurping of the traditional sheik power. It is most definitely not because of some new found agreement with the coalition forces.

It's happening without withdrawal. The thing to fear upon withdrawal isn't Sunni/Sunni problems. It's Sunni/Shi'a. The folks quoted in the essay are the most knowledgeable about what's happening, not us armchair types.

From William S. Lind's article in today's Counterpoint.com:

"The fact that some Sunni resistance groups may make cease-fires with American forces or even cooperate with them against al-Qaeda does not mean they accept the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government in the Green Zone. In judging the strategic implications of local cease-fires and alliances, we must remind ourselves that the strategic objective is re-creating an Iraqi state. Local cease-fires and alliances between U.S. forces and some Sunni resistance organizations do not necessarily move us toward that goal, however much they may benefit our forces on the ground or work against al-Qaeda. On the contrary, they may represent an acceptance on our part of the absence of an Iraqi state and our inability to create one. Such acceptance may be realistic and necessary, but it is also a recognition of strategic failure, whether or not we perceive it."

Couldn't find your link, but when was Mr. Lind last in Iraq?

Sorry, that should have been Counterpunch.com.

I don't think you have to be resident in Baghdad to have something cogent, relevant or meaningful to say about Iraq. That would eliminate most of us, wouldn't it?

They have facts that we may not have. And if you get a fairly consistent conclusion from people with diverse starting points coming to the same conclusion, it's worth paying attention to.

Even those who went there some time ago, can have views that are wildly out of synch with a rapidly changing situation. None of the people cited in the article are neo-cons, nor Bushies (albeit the author was a Pentagon spokesman.)

Larry:

It's happening without withdrawal. The thing to fear upon withdrawal isn't Sunni/Sunni problems. It's Sunni/Shi'a. The folks quoted in the essay are the most knowledgeable about what's happening, not us armchair types.

On the contrary. This coincided with the surge.

US troops withdrew from Anbar to focus on Baghdad and the local Sunni population turned on the AQ types, who they were tolerating until then.

What this demonstrates is that once we are out of the way, the Iraqis will indeed be in a position to remove the AQ types from Iraq.