The meaning of the label "liberal" in the USA has departed substantially from its original meaning, as still used in the UK. In America, liberal has come to be just a synonym for left. An American would say the British Labour Party was liberal. That sounds bizarre to an Englishman, like saying water is dry. But when the Englishman says Thatcher and Reagan are classic liberals (a true statement given the original meaning of the word) it sounds equally odd to Americans.

As for Slate and the meaning of neocon -- to me the term signifies:

-- A broadly pro-corporate, upper-half view of economic matters: supports free trade; forgot that trade unions even exist; little interest in corporate regulation (if not outright hostility); and considers that fuzzy-left notions like income equality are foolish and dull.

-- Believes in the projection of American power without answering to anyone outside US borders, except Israel. Believes that elites know best, and projection of US power does not require the approval or understanding of the little people.

Slate fits that pattern quite well, it seems to me, in stark contrast to Salon for example, never mind Alternet or Mother Jones. I characterized Slate as a range of soft to medium neocon, not the hardest variety you would see at the Weekly Standard or AEI. But neocon nevertheless. Daniel Gross is dismissive of Bush, but neocon does not require allegiance to Bush or even the Republicans. I would place Gross generally in the "freakonomics" genre, which popped up everywhere after the success of the book by that name. The general pattern is a detached analysis, pointing out how the laws of economics will have their way whether or not people, companies, or governments understand or agree. That is view falls easily within the neocon spectrum. (I like his columns and read them always.)

Kaplan is an example of the soft neocon. He forever says the war in Iraq is not working, but always pointing out at the end that there is no way out, we are stuck, and it must go on. The end of his most recent column is typical:

"And so, in this regard, Iraqis are not so different from Americans: They hate the war, they hate the occupation, but they don't know what to do about it; they don't know how to bring it to an end without very possibly sowing still greater destruction."

He doesn't question the true rationale for the war or who was behind it, or dwell on the lies and deceptions used to sell the war, or examine how the failure of the war is inevitably linked to the true rationale, lies, or deceptions. (See Kamiya, for example) To Kaplan, the war is like a hurricane, which blew in from wherever, and Bush blew the response. Neocons are smarter than Al Qaeda, who act as if any deviation from the party line must be punished. Neocons understand that some diversity is required, and that people like Kaplan provide the valuable service of "laundering" their mistakes, turning them from policy mistakes to unavoidable situations; and by forever criticizing the details, keeping the focus off the big picture. That pretty much defines the edge of the envelope that the WaPo or slate will publish.