Aside from Hitchens's involved arguments, another point validates the idea that al Qaeda in Mesopotamia is genuine al Qaeda. al Qaeda proper is organized through loose connections between its higher-ups and affiliate cells. In many ways, these cells operate independent from the "command," for lack of a better term. They maintain sparse communications, and some new terrorist cells affiliated themselves with al Qaeda only after their formation. Some southeast Asian terrorist groups are good examples. To put it another way, although al Qaeda has a central command of sorts, the chain of command is decentralized. This model of loose connections between command and cells (for which see a very good article on rotten.com/library comparing al Qaeda to an early Islamic secret society, the Assassins) seems to account for much of al Qaeda's success. Considering this, we should not be surprised that al Qaeda in Mesopotamia demonstrates little if any connection to the central command. However, this does NOT mean that the Mesopotamian variety has the same goals as the original flavor of al Qaeda. Another interesting facet of al Qaeda is that it networks cells with different goals together for its broader goals, taking advantage of the cells' initiative when it can. Their model of loose communication leaves little power for enforcement. The command can only suggest actions, hoping that the subordinate will go along with the plan.