"I would not speak nearly so loudly if it was my due to be believed." Montaigne

In a certain sense faith is belief in what cannot be sensibly "said", proven, thought, or known, based on a very particular understanding of the limits of language and thought. It is, by definition, transcendent; but not necessarily 'religious' in the traditional meaning of the word. The brilliant philosopher and logician Ludwig Wittgenstein in his masterwork: TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS sought to define and outline the limits of "saying", in an attempt to clarify and prove that much of the confusion associated with metaphysics and philosophy is a result of attempts to say what cannot be sensibly said. Questions like: WHAT IS FAITH? result from a misunderstanding of these limits. The language of Wittgenstein can be as shockingly simple as it is deep and reads like an odd mixture of humor, poetry, mathematics, and Zen. This is from the last page or two of the Tractatus. I hope that the lines will show up in this post as they appear in the book and as I have copied them here but fear they will be reformatted when they actually appear in this post. If the following lines appear as one jumbled mass then you will have to sort out where the line spaces and indentations belong. In most cases each sentence is an entire paragraph. The numbers correspond to certain groups of sentences.
After each group there is a line space before the next number begins. Here goes:

6.45 The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole.
The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling.

6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.
If a question can be, (sensibly) put al all, then it can also be answered.

6.51 Skepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked.
For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there is an answer, and this only where something can be said.

6.52 We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem.
(Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)

6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other-- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy--but it would be the only strictly correct method.

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.