. . . "morality" doesn't.

I don't, for instance, care about what's good for my neighbor on a spiritual, emotional, or even (necessarily) intellectual basis. Well, I might, but I don't imagine the government is the vessel by which I bring that concern to her doorstep. As a Nichiren Buddhist, I may chant for her well-being; as a theatre artist, I may try to get her to attend my shows, provide her with comps, work to write and produce work that strikes me as intellectually compelling, emotionally cathartic, and spiritually enlightening.

None of these actions, however, are legislative in character; none compel--or proscribe--behavior through threat of punishment.

I think, for me, the distinction between civic utility and morality lies in the distinction between the material and the philosophical/metaphysical. What's "good for society" should be materially demonstrable. Or rather--since all concern about the legislation of morality is about proscription, really--what's "bad for society" ought only be of concern insofar as it can be illustrated in empirical terms.

The level of concern for one's neighbor's well-being may well be indicative of your moral character, but when that concern extends from his material well-being to the condition of his soul, you're moving from the realm of civic utility to that of morality. Which is fine, as long as it's YOU, and not the long arm of the government, taking it upon yourself to enforce such convictions.