Assume for the sake of argument that the Supreme Court is right and that a justice whose campaign was financed mostly by one person should recuse himself/herself from cases involving that person. Fine, but what if the candidate loses? What if the WV businessman spent millions to defeat a sitting justice, but the justice he opposed still won? Could such a justice render an impartial verdict, or would that justice still be required to recuse himself/herself from the case? If the idea of potential bias is the standard, then it would seem that anyone who was largely supported or opposed by one person or group would have to recuse.

But, suppose you moved that from the financial to the policy issue. Suppose that a group of pro-life or pro-choice activists supports and elects a justice. Should that justice them recuse himself/herself from all issues involving abortion, due to the perception of bias?

In all probability, yes. That's why electing judges is a stupid system... Originally, the process was meant to improve the balance between the powers. But it has instead politicized the justice process and made it open to all kinds of lobbying, distantiating it more and more from its ultimate goal: the service of justice and the application of the law.

Ah..........the timeless "slippery slope" argument: we shouldn't do anything because it might lead to everything.

Do you doubt that it is clear that this WV judge should have recused himself? If so, then act on the clear case and don't go cowardly and leave in clear cases in doubt because other closer cases may follow. Show some faith and optimism in human nature. Don't give exercises of evil human nature a free bye because you can imagine more difficult questions.

Judges opposed by groups or rich individuals may or may not be ethically compromised: that's not this case. This case is a clear case where any objective standard would intervene. Draw the line here, where it is clear, and consider other factors when they present themselves as real "cases and controversies." We need not let our legal imaginations tie our hands.

Roberts is a deterministic judge--his opinions reflect his personal preferences and are then "rationalized" by "principles" he articulates as necessary window dressing. In this case, his argument that applying "due process" to create a new standard for judicial conduct is opening a new door for Supreme Court jurisprudence is seemingly valid. Anytime due process is extended into a new set of litigated facts the danger that amorphous standards may be at work is present and a judicial invitation for more litigation is issued.

However, the same Roberts had no problems saying that where official governmental racism had created real world disparities, it was constitutionally impermissible to consider race when fashioning a remedy. To Roberts, rationality doesn't support condemning this WV reprobate judge and it also must compels us to be constiutionally blind to race even when we acknowledge race was the basis of government discrimination.

Rationality is a slippery thing for judge Roberts.

Roberts will not apply his, "we must ignore the characteristic of the citizen which caused the discrimination" standard that he applied to race to other classes of victims: victims of age, alienage, handicap or any other characteristic-based discrimination. He has invented a "nuetral principle" that acts against only one class of victims: victims of racial discrimination. Suprise, suprise! The rich conservative white guy doesn't think black victims deserve protection in law that is available to other people.

Again, the man's jurisprudence is deterministic: If you know the litigants or the issues, you can reliably predict his vote beforehand: the propertied and those in authority will be legally vindicated as long as John Roberts wields a judicial hammer. So it was here--his vote was for the corrupt judge, supposedly under a principle that Roberts has ignored in other cases.

Let's give Roberts what he say he wants: objective standards. Congress has the power to impeach and remove judges for "high crimes and misdemeanors." Congress can establish a code of judicial ethics, violation of which is a misdemeanor requiring impeachment and removal. Obvious objective standards are available: Recusal required where one has a personal interest, where ones immediate family members have an interest, where one is associated by membership or other affiliation with a litigant, where one may be financially rewarded by the result, where bribery is present, where acceptance of anything of value from a litigant has occurred.

Promulgating the available objective standards into legislatively enacted codes of conduct is apparently necessary because we have arrogant judges and because the courts themselves have obviously done a piss poor job of policing themselves: this corrupt WV judge's victimization of a litigant had to go all the way to the federal Supreme Court before it was remedied, and the remedy leaves the filthy handed cretin on the WV bench.

If no man should be his own judge, then it is time for the legislature to impose ethical standards on judges.

A litigant paid millions of dollars to buy a judge to adjudicate his particular case which involved millions more?

And the bought judge tipped the scales of justice in favor of the litigant?

The question is not about how to properly recuse yourself from a case, the question is how did we get to the point where someone can buy a judge?

Chief Justice Roberts points out in his dissent that the plaintiff's bar in the state financed the opposition candidate to the tune of approximately $2 million. The plaintiff bar financed one candidacy and a businessman who wanted a judge more favorable toward his interests financed the other candidacy. If the other justice had prevailed after receiving all that money from the plaintiff bar, what would the recusal duties have been then?

If there are going to be judicial elections, then it certainly follows that people will attempt to elect judges who will be favorable toward their interests. This raises the question of whether judicial elections themselves are unconstitutional.

If a person/interest group donated heavily to the opposition candidate in a judicial election, should a judge recuse him/herself?

No. Otherwise, an interest wouldn't even have to find a viable candidate and win the election in order to tilt the scales of justice in their own favor, merely oppose the least favorable candidate.

Not being able to force recusal, the interest might think it wise not to potentially incite the incumbent by influencing the election.

Ipso facto, QED, and all that.

He said that Judge Benjamin's oppostion had 2 million dollars with which to finance his campaign. He was not saying that the Plantiff contributed 2 million to his campaign, which is not the case.

Roberts argument was that either candidate had a good chance of winning the election and therefore Blankenship was not guaranteed that his man would win. Not a really compelling agrument if you ask me, but then again, compared to the nonsense that Scalia tacked on to the end of the decision, it sounds downright reasonable.

And yeah, electing judges, if not unconstitutional, should be.

I didn't mean to imply that lawyers for the actual plaintiff contributed to the other side, just that trial lawyers in general, according to Roberts, heavily donated to the other side. But why doesn't that create a bias for the other judge? Trial lawyers might not care that much how a specific case goes, but it is certainly in their best interest to elect judges who will maximize their income through judicial decisions.

You could have a rule that no one with any interest in the outcome of any court case could contribute to an election campaign, but that would pretty much do away with judicial elections.

It seems to me that you really have only two options. Either have judges elected and be subject to the normal pressures of elected officials, or have them be appointed. The Kennedy decision doesn't really make sense, because it allows for elected judges but hopelessly attempts to insulate them from electoral politics.